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Fundamental Questions for Psychology  
  
This paper argues that the mainstream of psychology is misconceived in ways which 
make it largely unsuitable as a basis for clinical interventions.  
  
  
Why do we need a new way of thinking about work with distressed individuals? 
What is wrong with the many different styles of therapy and intervention already in 
use?   
  
Like any discipline, psychology has its problems. With regard to clinical work, 
many of these problems flow from the fundamentally dualistic character of 
psychology, the way in which it typically conceptualises important aspects of our 
being as so distinct and different that interactions and relationships between them 
appear problematic. The dualisms we are most concerned with here are that between 
mind and body, and that between individual and society.  
  
  
Mind-Body Dualism  
The relationship between mind and body continues to be a troubling issue for both 
philosophy and psychology. At least since Descartes, philosophers have explicitly 
addressed this relationship and have formulated numerous ways of understanding it 
(see for example Graham, 1993; Heil, 2004). By contrast, aside from the occasional 
mention in third-year undergraduate modules, in psychology the problems of this 
relationship are largely ignored. On the one hand psychology maintains a 
predominantly empirical focus, which means that underlying conceptual questions 
have less prominence. And on the other, the continuing relevance of mind-body 
dualism for psychology is concealed by the ways in which the discipline is 
fragmented and compartmentalised. For example, we have neuropsychology and 
biological psychology – and we also have the psychologies of cognition and 
attitudes. One set of subdisciplines addresses the brain (body), the other addresses 
thoughts (mind): but the subdisciplines remain almost entirely distinct from each 
other. Not only are they taught at university in separate modules, their advocates 
pursue disparate research agendas, attending conferences and publishing papers 
almost exclusively within the confines of their own specialism. In a sense, then, 
psychology has handled the problem of mind-body dualism primarily by enshrining 
it deep within the structure of the discipline. Consequently, whilst it is true to say 
that psychology, as a whole, does address both body and mind, the nature of the 
actual relationship between them is nevertheless rarely considered.  
  
  
Individual-Society Dualism  
The issue of how individuals and their society are related appears not only deeply 
problematic but also highly contentious, since it lies at the heart of many political 
philosophies and social policies; consequently, this dualism is problematic for other 
disciplines too. It is much discussed in sociology, for example, where it is referred 
to as agency-structure dualism – the question being whether individual agency or 
social structure are the most important determinants of societal reproduction and 
transformation (e.g. Archer, 2000). With regard to psychology, there are parallels 
between this issue and the problem of mind-body dualism. One parallel concerns 
how both dualisms are submerged by the disciplinary organization of academic 
knowledge and research. However, whereas the mind-body problem is primarily 
dissolved into subdisciplines of psychology, the problem of individual-society 
dualism is primarily dissolved into the distinctions between actual disciplines. So 
we have history, anthropology, sociology, economics, politics and cultural studies, 
which all study society and culture – and then we have psychology, the “science of 
[p.10] the individual”. Again, this disciplinary specialization means that the precise 
character of the relationship between individuals and their society simply tends to 
be ignored, as researchers pursue separate agendas within which this issue 
apparently plays only a minor role. As a consequence, individuals and their society 
typically appear as such totally distinct, separate entities that it then seems difficult 
to understand how they could possibly be related (Burkitt, 1991).  
  
  
Psychology’s character  
Speaking very generally, then, psychology is fragmented internally, within the 
actual discipline, by mind-body dualism; and at the same time it is circumscribed 
externally, at it’s boundaries with other disciplines, by the divide between 
individual and society. Note, however, that this claim describes general tendencies 
rather than absolute demarcations. For example, psychology is also structured 
externally by mind-body dualism, especially with the recent rise of cognitive 
neuroscience (Gazzaniga, 2000). It is also to some extent structured internally by 
individual-society dualism, as the perennially crisis ridden character of social 
psychology demonstrates (Parker, 1989). Moreover, it is not that bodies and the 
social world never become relevant within psychology, since clearly they do. The 
problem is that, as a consequence of the structuring influence of these two dualisms, 
they tend only to appear in particular ways. Because they are already conceived of 
as separate from and different to the primary stuff of psychology, which is usually 
taken to be cognition, bodies and the social world tend to enter psychology only as 
relatively static, uniform, fragmentary or contextual influences. Instead of being 
conceptualized from the outset as fundamentally necessary, integral, dynamic, 
constitutive elements of subjective experience, bodies and the social world tend to 
get included in theories and research designs as mere variables, relatively inert, 
neatly demarcated and primarily contextual factors, whose character and nature is 
definable, measurable, and clearly distinguishable from the disembodied, individual 
cognitions that form the primary focus of interest (Stam, 1998; Tolman, 1994).  
  
Some readers may object to this thumbnail sketch, feeling that this is both unfair 
and inaccurate. What about the biopsychosocial model? What about psychoanalysis, 
and social constructionism? Well, psychoanalysis and constructionism are both 
somewhat marginal in psychology, and so might exemplify precisely the kind of 
fragmentation we have described. Moreover, as alternatives they are not without 
their own problems: both are further fragmented into subdisciplinary schools of 
thought (Mitchell & Black, 1995; Nightingale & Cromby, 1999), and both are 
themselves somewhat dualistic in ways that resemble the psychological mainstream.  
  
For example, most psychoanalytic approaches reduce the body to metaphorical 
entities or processes, and maintain a relatively close focus on the internal dynamics 
of the person – in conjunction, perhaps, with the interpersonal dynamics of close 
relationships. However, interactions between individuals are always simultaneously 
societal as well as interpersonal: they occur in material contexts structured by social 
divisions such as class and gender; they are mediated by discursive and practical 
skills acquired through enculturation; and they are ordered by the norms and 
expectations of particular subcultures. Much psychoanalytic work fails to 
sufficiently address these fundamentally societal aspects of our relationships (Billig, 
1999), and so might also obscure the societal origins of much distress. And whilst 
recent advances in neuropsychoanalysis do partly redress the disembodiment of 
other psychodynamic schools (Solms & Turnbull, 2002), for the moment at least 
this remains just one more subdiscipline. Unless these advances are taken up and 
thoroughly integrated within psychodynamic thought, more broadly considered, 
mind-body dualism will simply be reinstated at a different level. Similarly, most 
variants of social constructionism fail to theorise or study actual, embodied 
individuals, instead focusing more-or-less exclusively on the discourses and 
positions that construct their identities and subject positions. Here, the social is not 
ignored, but instead treated [p.11] as though its linguistic aspect exhaustively 
embraces everything else. Somewhat paradoxically, social constructionism reflects 
the reductionism of mainstream psychology but simply inverts it into a kind of 
mirror image, substituting reduction to discourse for reduction to the individual 
(Cromby, 2004).  
  
By contrast, the biopsychosocial model is firmly within the mainstream of 
psychology - but as the Monty Python team might have said, “It’s only a model!” 
As such, it tends to be used in relatively undisciplined ways; it does not develop in 
coherent lines of progression; and in practice it tends to act primarily as a discursive 
warrant for linking together a chain of variables from different realms, often with 
some kind of foundational precedence given to the biological. Indeed, within the 
biopsychosocial model, just as elsewhere in psychology, the actual relationships 
between biology, individuals and society are rarely conceptualized. Instead, they are 
left to emerge piecemeal from the accumulation of empirical studies whose 
evidence is already shaped by unexamined preconceptions concerning the nature of 
these relationships - preconceptions which are consequently reproduced (typically 
covertly) within the evidence. The biopsychosocial model, in short, explains 
nothing because it does not set out to do so: it is a model, rather than a theory, and 
being limited to this status means that its preconceptions are rarely examined, and 
more rarely still refined and developed.  
  
Moreover, although other tendencies in psychology or related areas might seem to 
challenge these dualisms, on closer examination they have similar problems (for 
example, cognitive neuroscience struggles with conceptual issues analogous to 
those described here – see Bennett & Hacker, 2003). In any case, the continual 
reappearance of new attempts to cross the divides between individual and society or 
mind and body is itself yet more evidence of how deeply rooted these problems are. 
Broadly speaking, then, we think it fair to conclude that psychology is 
predominantly structured and shaped by dualisms in the way that we have described 
here.  
  
  
So what?  
These issues might seem far removed from the day to day business of intervening in 
the lives of distressed people, but a moment’s consideration should show that they 
are highly relevant. The history of clinical treatments and interventions falls into 
two broad strands, one focused primarily on the body and the other on the mind. 
Psychotherapeutic models of distress typically locate causality in the mind, whilst 
biological or psychiatric models locate it within the brain-body system. Both, 
however, tend to locate it within the individual, even though the influence of the 
social (as context, rather than constituent) might be acknowledged. With the 
exception of approaches within systemic, family therapy or community psychology, 
treatments and interventions tend to be similarly individualistic: and of these, only 
community psychology has the conceptual reach to address the structuring effects of 
social inequality.  
  
As a consequence, a relatively bizarre kind of psychology has become the 
mainstream. It is a psychology that prioritises conscious rational thought – cognition 
- over all other influences upon human activity: as though what people do 
(especially, perhaps, people in the extremes of distress) typically follows the 
contours of formal rationality. This psychology endows cognition with a weight of 
responsibility and a power of transformation that the evidence largely belies. It 
treats individuals as separate and distinct from the social fabric and power relations 
within which they are actually bodily embedded, and which in large part constitutes 
their moment-by-moment experience. It positions individuals as insightful, aware 
and controlling even though many of the influences upon them are far beyond their 
everyday comprehension. It is a disembodied psychology of individual cognitions.  
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